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ABSTRACT
Current blockchain technologies provide very limited means
of interoperability. In particular, solutions enabling block-
chains to verify the existence of data on other blockchains
are either very costly or are not fully decentralized.
To overcome these limitations, we introduce Testimonium,
a novel blockchain relay scheme that applies a validation-
on-demand pattern and the on-chain execution of Simpli-
fied Payment Verifications to enable the verification of data
across blockchains while remaining fully decentralized. Eval-
uating the scheme for Ethereum-based blockchains shows
that Testimonium achieves a cost reduction of up to 92%
over existing solutions. As such, the scheme lays a strong
foundation for generic blockchain interoperability. For in-
stance, it enables the development of an atomic-commit pro-
tocol for distributed transactions across blockchains.
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1. INTRODUCTION
For its ability to store data in a decentralized and im-
mutable way, blockchain technology has gained much at-
tention by the industry and research communities as po-
tentially disruptive in areas such as finance [26], business
process management [31], data provenance [32, 35], supply
chain management [38], or healthcare [25]. To take the di-
verse requirements of these use cases into account, a variety
of different blockchain platforms have been developed [41],
not unlike the emergence of various NoSQL databases as al-
ternatives to traditional database systems [36]. In this field
of multiple independent and unconnected blockchains [33], it
is unlikely that a “blockchain to rule them all” emerges [42].
This reinforces the need for interoperability solutions, espe-
cially in scenarios where organizations which utilize different
blockchains collaborate with each other.
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In such scenarios, it may be essential that state changes
across blockchains are treated as an atomic unit which ei-
ther succeeds or fails [5]. However—despite already be-
ing well-established for traditional databases [20]—such dis-
tributed transactions cannot be seamlessly transferred to the
blockchain field, since any interaction with external systems
might jeopardize the integrity and decentralization guar-
antees of blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum. Ideally,
blockchain interoperability is achieved while preserving the
properties of integrity and decentralization, i.e., the underly-
ing cross-blockchain communication should not rely on trust
in a centralized party.
One blockchain interoperability approach that is particu-
larly promising are so-called relay schemes. Relay schemes
replicate block information of some source blockchain within
a destination blockchain to allow the latter to verify the ex-
istence of data (e.g., transactions) on the source blockchain
without requiring trust in a centralized entity [12]. The
ability to verify arbitrary data across blockchains paves the
way for more generic blockchain interoperability, e.g., by en-
abling the implementation of an atomic-commit protocol for
distributed transactions across multiple blockchains [17].
For these verifications to be trustworthy, the block infor-
mation of the source blockchain needs to be validated by
the destination blockchain according to the validation rules
of the source blockchain. However, depending on the source
and destination blockchains, this validation can be very ex-
pensive when being performed on-chain. Within current re-
lay solutions [1, 22], this inevitably leads to either very high
operational cost or, if the expensive on-chain validation is
by-passed, the need to rely on a centralized component.
To overcome this issue, we introduce Testimonium, a relay
scheme that is fully decentralized while being cost-efficient
even for blockchains with expensive validation protocols.
The key to this concept is a sophisticated incentive scheme
combined with a validation-on-demand approach. We eval-
uate the scheme in a proof of concept implementation for
Ethereum-based blockchains to show that it achieves a cost
reduction of up to 92% over existing relay solutions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides back-
ground information while Section 3 describes the technical
contributions of this paper. In Section 4, we evaluate the
proposed relay with regards to security and operational cost.
In Section 5, we give an overview of related work. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper.
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Figure 1: Block header with Merkle tree and corre-
sponding Merkle proof of membership for Tx2
2. BACKGROUND
This section discusses important background information
for Testimonium. For this, we first explain the concept of
Simplified Payment Verification (SPV). We then describe
how SPVs are used to facilitate blockchain relay schemes.
2.1 Simplified Payment Verification
SPVs enable clients to cryptographically verify that a par-
ticular transaction is part of a blockchain without having to
store the full blockchain [26]. Instead of the full blockchain,
an SPV client only needs to keep a copy of the block head-
ers. In contrast to complete blocks, block headers only store
meta data (e.g., the block number) but no transaction data.
Thus, block headers only consume a fraction of the space a
complete block needs.
To get new block headers, the client can query nodes hav-
ing access to the full blockchain. Once the client has a copy
of the headers of the blockchain, users can prove to the SPV
client the inclusion of transactions in the blockchain and the
SPV client can verify these proofs without keeping a copy
of the actual transaction data. For that, the client lever-
ages the fact that the transactions of a block are stored as
leaves in a so-called Merkle tree [27] and that the hash of
the Merkle tree’s root node (Merkle root hash) is stored in
the block’s header (see Fig. 1).
In case a user wants to prove the inclusion of a particular
transaction to an SPV client, the user needs to provide a so-
called Merkle proof of membership. This proof contains all
nodes of the path from the transaction (leaf) up to the root
node (see Fig. 1). When receiving such a proof, an SPV
client recalculates the hashes of all nodes along the path
from the leaf (i.e., the transaction) up to the root node. If
the final hash matches the Merkle root hash of the stored
block header, the membership of the transaction within the
corresponding block has been successfully verified.
2.2 Relay Schemes
SPV clients have the ability to verify whether or not a
particular transaction exists on some blockchain. Block-
chain relays like BTC Relay [1] and PeaceRelay [22] utilize
this capability to enable transaction inclusion verifications
across blockchains. Essentially, relays are SPV clients for a
source blockchain running on a destination blockchain. For
instance, BTC Relay is a relay running on the Ethereum
blockchain (i.e., the destination blockchain) enabling trans-
action inclusion verifications on block headers from the Bit-
coin blockchain (i.e., the source blockchain).
For successful SPV, the relay needs to know about the
block headers of the source blockchain. For that, block head-
ers of the source blockchain need to be constantly submitted
to the relay by off-chain clients [12]. With knowledge of all
block headers of the source blockchain, the relay can leverage
SPV to verify on the destination blockchain that a particular
transaction has been included in the source blockchain.
To keep the system fully decentralized, i.e., to not re-
quire any trust in any off-chain client, newly submitted block
headers are first validated by the relay before transaction in-
clusion verifications can be performed on them [12]. Further-
more, competing branches of a blockchain are a common oc-
currence especially in Proof of Work (PoW) blockchains [40].
While these branches usually consist of valid blocks, only
one branch is eventually accepted as the main chain (e.g.,
in PoW blockchains, the branch with the greatest amount
of work invested in it [12]). As transaction inclusion verifi-
cations should only be performed for block headers that are
part of the current main chain of the source blockchain, the
relay needs to track the branch representing the main chain.
A block header is considered valid if it complies with the
source blockchain’s standard validation procedure. Among
other things, this usually involves validating the consensus
algorithm. For instance, in PoW it needs to be verified
that enough work has been performed whereas for other
blockchains it may consist of checking that at least a cer-
tain amount of validators (e.g., 2/3) signed the block [12].
Existing relays like BTC Relay perform the source block-
chain’s header validation for every submitted block header.
However, depending on the source and destination block-
chains, verifying the validity of a block header on-chain can
be computation- and storage-intensive. For example, val-
idating Ethash, the PoW algorithm of Ethereum, requires
fragments of the data used during mining to be available on-
chain. Even optimized solutions need approximately 3 mil-
lion gas when executed on an Ethereum-based blockchain
(see Section 4). Performing this validation for every block
header of the source blockchain leads to extremely high op-
erational cost. To the best of our knowledge, current relay
schemes offer no solutions to this problem without involving
trusted third parties (see Section 5).
To tackle this issue, we introduce Testimonium, a relay
scheme that achieves a significant cost reduction over tradi-
tional blockchain relays. The fundamental concepts of Tes-
timonium are discussed in the following section.
3. TESTIMONIUM RELAY SCHEME
This section introduces Testimonium, a relay scheme that
keeps cost of executing SPVs on-chain to a minimum by
deploying a validation-on-demand pattern for relayed block
headers. Testimonium requires no trust in a single entity as
validations are executed on-chain with a reward structure
incentivizing participation.
As mentioned in Section 2, blockchain relays store a copy
of the block headers of some source blockchain. The Tes-
timonium relay scheme assumes the block headers of the
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source blockchain to be based on the data structure pro-
posed by Satoshi Nakamoto [26], which is for example the
case for Bitcoin and Ethereum, and the many forks of these
blockchain protocols. That is, block headers contain at least
the hash of the block’s parent, the block’s height, and the
hash of the root node of the Merkle tree containing the
block’s transactions. These three fields are referred to as
parentHash, blockHeight, and merkleRoot, respectively. In
Section 4.3, we discuss additional requirements the involved
blockchains need to satisfy. Furthermore, Testimonium in-
troduces some additional fields typically not present in block
headers. These fields are needed for executing certain ac-
tions and are prefixed with an m (for “meta”) to distinguish
them from fields usually present in a block header.
Testimonium consists of the relay itself (an on-chain pro-
gram running on the destination blockchain) and two types
of off-chain clients: submitters are responsible for relaying
block headers from the source blockchain to the destination
blockchain, and disputers are responsible for detecting and
disputing submitted illegal block headers.
3.1 Replicating the Source Blockchain
In relay schemes, off-chain clients continuously submit
block headers of the source blockchain to the relay on the
destination blockchain. When a new header is submitted,
multiple actions are performed by the Testimonium relay
before the submitted header can be used for verifying the
existence of transactions on the source blockchain.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code for the procedure un-
dertaken by the Testimonium relay whenever a new block
header is submitted by an off-chain client. Right after the
arrival of a new header, it is checked whether the retrieved
header has already been submitted to the relay (Line 2). If
this is the case, the submitted header is rejected. Submit-
ted block headers are stored in a global hashmap using the
header’s hash as key and the header itself as value. The func-
tion hash represents the hash function used on the source
blockchain to calculate block hashes, e.g., when storing Bit-
coin headers, hash would implement SHA-256 [27].
Next, it is checked whether the block referenced by the
field parentHash exists on the relay (i.e., whether it has al-
ready been submitted to the Testimonium relay), as shown
in Line 5. This ensures that only a continuous chain of block
headers is replicated within the Testimonium relay.
Optimistically Accepting Block Headers
As stated in Section 2.2, executing the source blockchain’s
header validation procedure on the destination blockchain
can be very expensive. Performing this validation for every
block header of the source blockchain would lead to high
operational cost. Therefore, Testimonium follows an opti-
mistic approach where received block headers are accepted
at first without being fully validated (Line 7).
Of course, since submitted block headers are not fully val-
idated, illegal block headers may be accepted by the Testi-
monium relay, potentially enabling the verification of illegal
transactions. Testimonium prevents this by assigning a lock
period to newly received block headers (Line 8). During
this period, a block header is considered “locked”, meaning
that it cannot be used for transaction inclusion verifications.
Furthermore, within this lock period, off-chain clients (i.e.,
the disputers) can dispute headers they deem illegal. In
case of a dispute, the header validation is carried out by
Algorithm 1 Procedure performed by the Testimonium re-
lay when receiving a new header of the source blockchain
1: function SubmitBlockHeader(header, submitter)
2: if headers.contains(hash(header)) == true then
3: return false
4: parentHash = header.parentHash
5: if headers.contains(parentHash) == false then
6: return false
7: headers.put(hash(header), header)
8: header.m.lockedUntil = now + LOCK PERIOD
9: header.m.submitter = submitter
10: parent = headers.get(parentHash)
11: parent.m.chldn.append(hash(header))
12: branchHeads.add(hash(header))
13: if branchHeads.contains(parentHash) then
14: branchHeads.remove(parentHash)
15: header.m.branchId = parent.m.branchId
16: header.m.junction = parent.m.junction
17: else
18: lastBranchId = lastBranchId + 1
19: header.m.branchId = lastBranchId
20: header.m.junction = parentHash
21: if parent.m.chldn.length == 2 then
22: setJunction(parent.m.chldn[0],parentHash)
23: mainChainHead = getMainChainHead( )
the Testimonium relay and if the validation fails, the illegal
block header is eliminated. Section 3.3 discusses the dis-
puting of illegal block headers in detail. Further, to make
submitters of illegal block headers accountable, the submit-
ter’s address is stored in the received block header by using
the field m.submitter, as shown in Line 9.
Handling Blockchain Branches
In PoW blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum, multiple
valid blocks with the same block height can exist in paral-
lel, forming so-called blockchain branches. While multiple
branches can exist in parallel, only one of these branches
represents the current main chain of the blockchain, e.g., in
PoW blockchains this is the branch with the most amount of
work invested in it [12]. As more block headers are appended
to branches, the main chain of a blockchain may change over
time. This represents a challenge to on-chain SPV execu-
tion since transaction inclusion verifications should only be
successful if the requested block is part of the main chain.
A branch head represents the most recent block header of
a blockchain branch. To keep track of all existing branches
of the source blockchain, the Testimonium relay tracks the
head of each branch. This way, the relay is able to constantly
re-evaluate the current main chain of the source blockchain,
e.g., in PoW blockchains, the main chain is identified by
searching for the branch with the highest total difficulty.
Whenever a new block header has passed the validation,
it is added to the set of branch heads (Line 12) as it either
becomes the new head of an existing branch or it represents
the start of a completely new branch. If a block header
continues an already existing branch, it replaces its parent
as a branch head (Lines 13ff). If a block header creates a
new branch, the header is merely appended to the branch
head set as the creation of a new branch does not affect
existing branch heads. The branch head of the main chain
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is stored in the global variable mainChainHead. Whenever
a new block header is submitted, the current main chain is
re-evaluated (Line 23).
Enabling Efficient Verifications
Whenever a transaction inclusion verification is requested on
a certain block, the Testimonium relay needs to determine
whether the block is part of the main chain of the source
blockchain. As each block header contains a hash pointer to
its parent forming a linked list, we could simply trace from
the main chain’s head (stored in variable mainChainHead,
Line 23) all the way back until we reach the requested block
or the genesis block. However, depending on how far back
the requested block lies, this traversal can be expensive. To
make this traversal more cost-efficient, the Testimonium re-
lay stores additional helper variables with each block header.
First, it stores a reference to the preceding branch junc-
tion, i.e., a reference to the header where the branch of
the newly submitted block header branched off. Second, it
stores a number identifying a subpath of the current branch,
i.e., the branch of which the newly submitted block header
is the new head. We refer to this number as branch id. This
meta data is stored in the fields m.junction and m.branchId,
respectively. In case the submitted header continues an ex-
isting branch, m.junction and m.branchId are set to the cor-
responding field values of its parent, as shown in Lines 15
and 16. If a new branch occurs, m.branchId gets assigned
the maximum branch id used so far incremented by one and
m.junction of the submitted header is set to the parent’s
hash (Lines 18 to 20). The helper fields m.branchId and
m.junction enable a more efficient search when verifying
transaction inclusions, as the backwards traversal can be
executed in jumps from branch junction to branch junction
rather than from block to block.
Furthermore, the Testimonium relay keeps track of each
block header’s children. We refer to some block c as child of
some other block p if the parentHash of c holds a reference to
p. Further, we refer to a block d as descendant of some other
block p if d can reach p using the hash pointers (parentHash)
forming the linked list. Analogous, we refer to block p as
predecessor of block d. Whenever a new block header is
received, the Testimonium relay adds its hash to its parent’s
child list (Line 11). Typically, a header only has one child.
If the header is a branch junction, the list contains at least
two children (i.e., the hashes of the block headers branching
off from the header).
The child list is useful for a number of reasons. First, it
allows an easier updating of the m.junction field. In case a
new branch junction emerges (Line 21), the m.junction field
of the descendants of the new branch junction needs to be set
to the hash of the branch junction. The function setJunc-
tion (Line 22) updates each descendant until a header is
reached that has either no child (i.e., the header is a branch
head) or at least two children (i.e., the header represents
another branch junction). Second, in case a block header
is successfully disputed, the child list is used to delete all
block headers that were appended to the illegal block (see
Section 3.3).
Finally, the child list is also used to facilitate transaction
inclusion verifications since it helps to determine the number
of confirming blocks. In the next section, we look at how
these verifications are carried out in detail.
3.2 Transaction Inclusion Verifications
As soon as a block header of the source blockchain is
replicated within the Testimonium relay on the destination
blockchain, transaction inclusion verifications on that block
header are possible. For that, a client (e.g., a smart con-
tract) sends a request to the Testimonium relay in the form
of “Is transaction tx of block b part of the source blockchain
and confirmed by at least n blocks?”. To answer such a ver-
ification request, the relay executes an on-chain SPV. First,
it verifies that the header of block b is known, unlocked (i.e.,
the lock period has passed), and part of the main chain of
the source blockchain. Second, it verifies that block b is con-
firmed by at least n succeeding blocks. Finally, the Merkle
proof of membership which has to be submitted together
with the verification request is validated.
Verifying Block Membership on the Main Chain
As outlined in Section 3.1, the Testimonium relay assigns
a branch id to every submitted block header. Whenever
a submitted block header branches off a new branch, the
currently maximum branch id is incremented by one and
assigned to the new header. In case a submitted header
continues an existing branch, it gets assigned the branch id
of its parent.
Consider the example illustrated in Fig. 2 which shows
a source blockchain replicated within a Testimonium relay.
As can be seen, all block headers between two consecutive
branch junctions or between a branch junction and a branch
head have the same branch id BranchId. Since a submitted
header’s branch id is either set to its parent’s branch id or
to the maximum branch id incremented by one, we know
that all descendants of some block header h have a branch
id equal to or greater than the branch id of h. Analogous,
all predecessors of h have a branch id equal to or lower than
the branch id of h.
Hence, when verifying the main chain membership of some
block header h that has a branch id greater than the branch
id of the main chain’s head, we know that header h is not
part of the main chain without having to traverse any head-
ers of the main chain.
This constraint is used by Algorithm 2 to verify that a
certain block header is part of the main chain of the source
blockchain, i.e., whether the block header is a predecessor of
the main chain’s head. The parameter blockHash holds the
hash of the block header to check, whereas target contains
the corresponding header (Line 2).
The algorithm starts at the main chain’s head (Line 3).
From that point on, the algorithm traverses each branch
junction reachable from the head as long as the currently
traversed block header’s branch id is greater than the branch
id of target (Lines 7-13).
Since all headers between two consecutive branch junc-
tions or between a branch junction and the branch’s head
always have the same branch id, it is completely sufficient to
only traverse branch junctions. Since all headers in-between
are skipped, the algorithm needs to check only few block
headers instead of traversing all headers between the header
to look for (i.e., target) and the main chain’s head.
After the execution of the while-loop, variable current
contains the branch junction with a branch id equal to or
lower than the branch id of target. If the branch id of cur-
rent is strictly lower than the branch id of target, target
cannot be a part of the main chain and the function returns
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Block 0x11
Height: 17
BranchId: 1
Junction: 0x10
Block 0x12
Height: 18
BranchId: 1
Junction: 0x10
Block 0x13
Height: 19
BranchId: 1
Junction: 0x12
Block 0x14
Height: 19
BranchId: 2
Junction: 0x12
Block 0x15
Height: 20
BranchId: 1
Junction: 0x12
Block 0x16
Height: 21
BranchId: 1
Junction: 0x15
Block 0x18
Height: 21
BranchId: 3
Junction: 0x15
Block 0x19
Height: 22
BranchId: 3
Junction: 0x15
Block 0x1A
Height: 23
BranchId: 3
Junction: 0x15
Block 0x17
Height: 22
BranchId: 1
Junction: 0x15Block 0x10
Height: 16
BranchId: 1
Junction: 0x2
Block 0x1B
Height: 17
BranchId: 4
Junction: 0x10
Figure 2: An example illustrating the replication of a source blockchain within a Testimonium relay. Headers
are double-linked, denoted by arrows pointing in both directions. Green headers represent the current main
chain of the source blockchain. For the sake of simplicity, block hashes are in ascending order to make it
clearly evident which block headers have been submitted before others to the relay, e.g., block header 0x11
was submitted after block header 0x10, 0x1B after 0x1A, and so on. Block headers 0x1B, 0x14, 0x17, and
0x1A are heads of the corresponding branch. Block headers 0x10, 0x12, and 0x15 represent branch junctions.
false (Line 14f). Otherwise, we know that both headers have
the same branch id, i.e., they are both part of at least one
common branch.
However, it can still be the case that target is not part
of the main chain. Consider block headers 0x15 and 0x16
in Fig. 2. If 0x15 is the header returned by the loop (i.e.,
current) and 0x16 the header to look for (i.e., target), 0x15
is part of the main fork while 0x16 is not. As such, the Tes-
timonium relay compares the block heights of current and
target. If target.blockHeight > current.blockHeight, target is
not part of the main chain and the function returns false.
If target.blockHeight <= current.blockHeight, current and
target are either the same or current is a branch junction
between target and the main chain’s head. Hence, in both
cases, target is part of the main chain.
Further, when traversing branch junctions, each branch
junction is checked whether its lock period has passed. If an
unlocked branch junction is encountered for the first time,
its child along the path of the main chain is stored in the
variable confirmStart (Lines 10-13). If the main chain’s head
is already unlocked, then all branch junctions on the main
chain are unlocked as well (they have been submitted either
before or at the same time as the main chain’s head). In
this case, we store the main chain’s head in the variable
confirmStart before entering the loop (Lines 5-6), causing
the check of each encountered branch junction’s lock period
to be skipped. Besides a boolean indicating whether the
header to look for lies on the main chain, the algorithm also
returns the confirmStart variable. The header referenced by
confirmStart is used as starting point for verifying whether
the requested header has enough confirming block headers.
Once more, consider the example in Fig. 2. Assuming the
function is called with block hash 0x11, and block 0x15 is the
latest unlocked branch junction, then the starting point for
the confirmation verification is block 0x18. The algorithm
verifying the number of confirmations is discussed in the
following section.
Verifying Sufficient Block Confirmations
Besides checking whether the header of the block supposedly
containing the transaction to verify is part of the main chain
of the source blockchain, it also needs to be ensured that the
header is confirmed by enough succeeding block headers.
Algorithm 2 Verifies whether the block header referenced
by blockHash is part of the main chain of the source block-
chain.
1: function isPartOfMainChain(blockHash)
2: target = headers.get(blockHash)
3: current = headers.get(mainChainHead)
4: confirmStart = 0
5: if current.m.lockedUntil < now then
6: confirmStart = mainChainHead
7: while current.m.branchId > target.m.branchId do
8: oldBranchId = current.m.branchId
9: current = headers.get(current.m.junction)
10: if confirmStart != 0 then continue
11: if current.m.lockedUntil < now then
12: confirmStart =
13: getChildByBranch(current, oldBranchId)
14: if current.m.branchId < target.m.branchId then
15: return (false, confirmStart)
16: if current.blockHeight < target.blockHeight then
17: return (false, confirmStart)
18: return (true, confirmStart)
Algorithm 3 shows the pseudo code for this verification.
Variable blockHash indicates the block header from where
to start the verification, and confirmations specifies the re-
quired number of succeeding blocks. Note, the concrete
number of block confirmations considered secure depends on
the source blockchain, e.g., in Bitcoin six succeeding blocks
are deemed sufficient [9].
The algorithm starts from the specified block header (i.e.,
blockHash) and recursively calls the function for each suc-
ceeding block header each time decreasing the number of
required confirmations by one (Line 9). In case the block
header referenced by the parameter blockHash does not ex-
ist, the algorithm returns false (Line 2f). Similarly, a block
header that has not reached the end of the lock period yet
may still be disputed and identified as invalid by disputers.
Hence, in case the algorithm encounters a block header that
is still locked, the verification fails as well (Line 5f).
If the block header exists and is unlocked, it is checked
whether further confirmations are required for the block
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Algorithm 3 Verifies whether the block referenced by block-
Hash has at least as many confirmations as specified in the
parameter confirmations.
1: function isConfirmed(blockHash, confirmations)
2: if headers.contains(blockHash) == false then
3: return false
4: header = headers.get(blockHash)
5: if header.m.lockedUntil >= now then return false
6: if confirmations == 0 then return true
7: if header.m.chldn.length == 0 then return false
8: child = header.m.chldn[0]
9: return isConfirmed(child, confirmations-1)
header (Line 6f). If no more confirmations are required,
the function returns true, since the block exists, is unlocked
and confirmed. Otherwise, we check whether the header is a
branch head, i.e., has no children (Line 7f). If the header is
a branch head but requires further confirmations, false is re-
turned, since the header has no succeeding blocks confirming
it. If not, isConfirmed is called on the next child.
Notably, the algorithm always chooses the first child for
the next recursive call (Line 8). Of course, in case the block
header is a branch junction, multiple children exist. Thus,
the caller of the algorithm needs to make sure that the func-
tion is only called on a block header and a number of confir-
mations so that no further branch junction that is unlocked
is reached as the algorithm would need to choose the right
child in that case.
To avoid this edge case, the function isPartOfMain-
Chain presented in Algorithm 2 precalculates the starting
block header for the confirmation verification (variable con-
firmStart), i.e., since it already traverses all branch junc-
tions between the main chain’s head and the requested block
header, it can store any branch junction it traverses that is
already unlocked. Since all predecessors of that branch junc-
tion are ensured to be unlocked as well, we can start the
confirmation verification from that branch junction instead
of from the requested block header with a reduced number of
confirmations. If we encounter another branch junction dur-
ing the confirmation verification, the branch junction will be
locked, stopping the verification. If the branch junction were
not locked, the branch junction would have already been re-
turned by function isPartOfMainChain as starting point
for the confirmation verification.
Verifying Merkle Proof of Membership
After verifying that block b is part of the source block-
chain’s current main chain and that block b is confirmed by
at least n succeeding blocks, the Testimonium relay checks
the Merkle proof of membership. A Merkle proof depends
on the data structures used in the source blockchain to rep-
resent Merkle trees. Our proof of concept (see Section 4)
implements Merkle proof of memberships for Merkle Patri-
cia Tries [2], a Merkle tree variation used in blockchains like
Ethereum and Ethereum Classic.
If the verification of the Merkle proof fails, tx is not part
of block b. If it is successful, tx is included within the block.
Since the Testimonium relay has already verified block b’s
membership in the main chain of the source blockchain and
n blocks succeeding b, it can be assumed that transaction
tx is in fact part of the source blockchain.
Algorithm 4 Performs the validation of the disputed block
header. If the validation fails, the header and all its descen-
dants are removed. The function returns a list containing
the addresses of submitters of illegal headers.
1: function disputeHeader(blockHash)
2: header = headers.get(blockHash)
3: if header.m.lockedUntil > now then return []
4: if isValid(header) == true then return []
5: submitters = pruneBranch(blockHash)
6: parent = headers.get(header.parentHash)
7: parent.m.chldn.remove(blockHash)
8: if parent.m.chldn.length == 0 then
9: branchHeads.add(header.parentHash)
10: if parent.m.chldn.length == 1 then
11: updateDesc(parent.m.chldn[0],
parent.m.junction, parent.m.branchId)
12: mainChainHead = getMainChainHead( )
13: return submitters
As mentioned before, by specifying a sufficiently large
number of confirmations, clients requesting a verification
increase the probability that transaction tx remains in the
main chain of the source blockchain. Further, the verifica-
tion procedure relies on the source blockchain’s headers be-
ing exactly replicated within the Testimonium relay on the
destination blockchain. Therefore, it is important that the
disputers challenge any illegal block headers during the lock
period. The details of disputing block headers are discussed
in the next section.
3.3 Disputing Block Headers
To keep the cost of header submissions low, the Testi-
monium relay optimistically accepts newly submitted block
headers without performing the source blockchain’s header
validation procedure at first. While this potentially enables
illegal block headers to enter the relay, transaction inclusion
verifications on such illegal block headers are prevented in
Testimonium by means of a validation-on-demand pattern.
That is, each newly submitted header is assigned a lock
period during which off-chain clients (i.e., the disputers)
can dispute any block headers they deem illegal. When a
block header is disputed, the header validation according
to the validation protocol of the source blockchain is car-
ried out. If the validation fails, the illegal branch, i.e., the
block header together with all its descendants is eliminated
from the Testimonium relay. Only after the lock period has
passed, transaction inclusion verifications on the submitted
headers can be carried out.
The validation-on-demand pattern can be leveraged when-
ever the block header validation is so costly that validating
every single block header becomes too expensive.
Validation-on-demand
Algorithm 4 shows the pseudo code for the steps performed
whenever a block header is challenged by a disputer. The
algorithm takes the hash of the disputed header as input
parameter. First, it checks whether the disputed header is
still locked, i.e., whether the lock period has not expired
yet (Line 3). Headers which are not locked anymore are
deemed valid, so they cannot be disputed.
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If the lock period of the header is still active, the header
validation is triggered (Line 4). The concrete implementa-
tion of this validation depends on the block header valida-
tion procedure of the source blockchain. In our reference
implementation, the verification of Ethereum block head-
ers is carried out on block header disputes, since verify-
ing Ethash—the consensus algorithm used by blockchains
such as Ethereum and Ethereum Classic—for every submit-
ted block header would otherwise lead to high operational
cost (see Section 4).
If the validation returns true, i.e., the block header is valid
and was falsely disputed, the function aborts (Line 4). In
case the disputed header is in fact invalid (the validation
returns false), the illegal branch originating from the dis-
puted header is removed from the Testimonium relay. For
that, the function pruneBranch is called (Line 5).
After the deletion of the illegal branch, the header’s hash
is also removed from its parent’s child list (Line 7). Since
the child list has been changed, we check in Line 8 whether
the parent of the disputed block header has now become a
branch head. If so, the parent’s hash is added to the set of
branch heads (Line 9). If the parent has exactly one child
left (Line 10), the parent is no longer a branch junction.
Hence, we set the fields m.junction and m.branchId of all
descendants up to and including the next branch junction
or branch head to the corresponding fields of the parent (call
of updateDesc in Line 11). We omit the pseudo code of
this simple function due to space constraints. Further, the
removal of an entire branch from the Testimonium relay may
change the main chain. Thus, in Line 12, the head of the
main chain is recalculated.
Pruning Illegal Branches
Algorithm 5 shows the pseudo code for the pruneBranch
function which is called to remove an illegal branch. Be-
fore the disputed block header itself is removed, the func-
tion is called recursively for each child of the disputed block
header (Line 5). The recursive invocation of pruneBranch
stops in case the header referenced by blockHash has no chil-
dren, i.e., it is a branch head. If so, besides removing the
header from the headers hash map, the header’s hash is also
removed from the set of branch heads (Lines 7-10).
To make submitters of illegal block headers accountable,
the disputeHeader function returns a list containing the
addresses of the submitters of all the block headers being re-
moved with the illegal branch. Of course, in case no header
was successfully disputed (e.g., due to an expired lock pe-
riod), no address is returned. The returned addresses are
used to penalize submitters to discourage the submission of
illegal block headers in the future (see Section 3.4).
The correct functioning of the Testimonium relay is only
ensured if submitters continuously submit block headers of
the source blockchain to the destination blockchain and if
disputers dispute submitted illegal block header. However,
clients that submit and dispute block headers incur cost.
Thus, an incentive structure for encouraging participation is
needed. The details of this incentive structure are explained
in the next section.
3.4 Incentive Structure
Without an incentive structure that compensates off-chain
clients for submitting and disputing block headers, submit-
ters and disputers may have no interest in participating. The
Algorithm 5 Prunes the branch starting at the header ref-
erenced by blockHash
1: function pruneBranch(blockHash)
2: header = headers.get(blockHash)
3: submitters = []
4: for all child in header.m.chldn do
5: branchSubmitters = pruneBranch(child)
6: submitters.appendAll(branchSubmitters)
7: headers.remove(blockHash)
8: submitters.append(header.m.submitter)
9: if branchHeads.contains(blockHash) then
10: branchHeads.remove(blockHash)
11: return submitters
incentive structure we propose rewards off-chain clients for
submitting and disputing block headers and also discourages
submitters from submitting illegal block headers.
To compensate the disputers for challenging illegal block
headers, the submitters are required to deposit a stake. The
stake is locked for the duration of the lock period of newly
submitted block headers. While the stake is locked, it can-
not be withdrawn and cannot be used for submitting further
block headers. After a submitted header has passed the lock
period without a dispute, the submitter gets back control of
the corresponding locked stake. However, in case the block
header is disputed successfully within the lock period, i.e.,
the validation of the block header fails, the disputer that
triggered the dispute earns the locked stake of the submit-
ter as well as any stake that was locked for any descendant
of the illegal block header. Not only does this incentivize
disputers, it also discourages submitters from submitting il-
legal block headers as they risk losing the deposited stake.
Of course, disputers are only incentivized to dispute headers
if the potential reward is higher than the cost of executing
the dispute.
To encourage the submission of block headers, submit-
ters receive a fee every time their submitted headers are
used for verifying the inclusion of transactions. This ver-
ification fee is paid by the client requesting the verifica-
tion. In order to fully compensate submitters, the total fees
earned by transaction inclusion verifications on each header
need to be greater than the initial submission cost for that
header (Eq. (1)).
fee× no. of verifications > submission cost (1)
The minimum verification fee can thus be calculated as
the submission cost of a block header divided by the number
of verifications taking place on the submitted block header
(Eq. (2)).
fee >
submission cost
no. of verifications
(2)
Applying a validation-on-demand pattern together with
an incentive structure rewarding participation already low-
ers the cost of submitting new block headers to the re-
lay. However, submission cost can be decreased even fur-
ther by applying a slightly modified version of the content-
addressable storage pattern [15] which is explained in the
next section.
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3.5 Further Optimization
So far, we have assumed that all data needed for disputes
and transaction inclusion verifications is directly stored in
the smart contract implementing the Testimonium relay.
However, in blockchains like Bitcoin or Ethereum, all sub-
mitted transactions including their parameters are implic-
itly recorded in each blockchain’s transaction history. We
can take advantage of this fact storing only the hash of the
block header, the block number and certain meta data in
the smart contract itself. Fields such as the parent hash or
the Merkle root hash no longer need to be kept in the smart
contract, thus reducing the amount of stored data per block
header which subsequently reduces submission cost.
Whenever clients initiate a dispute or a transaction in-
clusion verification, they read the required full header data
from the corresponding submit-transactions recorded in the
transaction history and provide it to the smart contract.
The contract can then verify the provided headers’ integrity
by recalculating their hashes and comparing it to the hashes
stored in the smart contract. This way, no trust in the
client invoking a transaction inclusion verification or a block
header dispute is required.
While this pattern further reduces submission cost, it leads
to an increment of cost for transaction inclusion verifications
due to the increased amount of data that has to be passed
along with each transaction. In the next section, we provide
an extensive evaluation of Testimonium assessing this trade-
off as well as providing a comprehensive security analysis.
4. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the proposed relay scheme
with regards to operational cost and security. Further, we
look at the prerequisites that must be fulfilled to deploy a
Testimonium relay scheme.
4.1 Quantitative Analysis
The advantages of Testimonium over traditional block-
chain relays become apparent when the execution of the
source blockchain’s standard header validation on the des-
tination blockchain is very costly. One example of this
would be a bi-directional relay between Ethereum and Eth-
ereum Classic. Both, Ethereum and Ethereum Classic, use
Ethash as PoW algorithm and the Ethereum Virtual Ma-
chine (EVM) as execution environment. However, for the
verification of Ethash, no native opcodes exist in the EVM.
Even with gas-optimized implementations as the one pro-
vided by SmartPool [23], the verification of Ethash for a sin-
gle block header still costs around 3 million gas, potentially
leading to very high operational cost when fully validating
every single block header. Hence, these blockchains are a
perfect fit for the validation-on-demand pattern employed
by the Testimonium relay scheme.
A further advantage of implementing Testimonium first
for Ethereum-based blockchains is in the context of side-
chains. Sidechains can be used to increase overall trans-
action throughput of a blockchain platform by outsourcing
certain transactions to a sidechain [6]. To transfer digital
assets between the main chain and the sidechain, relays can
be used to prove the existence of certain pieces of state on
one chain from the other chain and vice versa. Ethereum
being the most popular blockchain with regards to decen-
tralized applications (DApps) and digital assets [13, 14] has
Table 1: Prototype Functionality
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Validation-on-submission X
Validation-on-demand X X
Content-adressable storage X
Na¨ıve search X
Optimized search X X
experienced severe scalability issues in the past [13]. Side-
chains have been proposed to combat these issues [28]. As
Testimonium leads to cost savings of up to 92% over tradi-
tional relays for Ethereum-based blockchains, the operation
of sidechains for Ethereum becomes a lot cheaper.
Evaluation Setup
To evaluate the operating cost of Testimonium, we have
implemented a total of three prototypes (Testimonium1,
Testimonium2, and Baseline, respectively) for EVM-based
blockchains like Ethereum and Ethereum Classic. The pro-
totypes Testimonium1 and Testimonium2 both implement
the validation-on-demand pattern. Testimonium2 addition-
ally applies the content-addressable storage optimization as
explained in Section 3.5. The third prototype Baseline acts
as baseline for our experiments. This prototype does not
implement the validation-on-demand pattern. Instead, it
fully validates each block header at submission as done by
traditional relays such as BTCRelay. Furthermore, Baseline
does not use the optimized search algorithm for transaction
inclusion verifications and instead implements a na¨ıve search
starting from the main chain’s head, traversing each header
until the header supposedly containing the transaction is
found or the genesis block is reached. The functionality of
each prototype is summed up in Table 1.
Using a Geth light client (version 1.9.10), we collected
154,445 block headers containing 2,542 branches from the
Ethereum main network over a period of two months. Note
that we also count uncle blocks as branches, since—when
submitted to Testimonium—they would introduce a new
branch. We then fed these block headers into the three
prototypes that were deployed as smart contracts to a pri-
vate development blockchain running on a Parity Ethereum
node (version 2.6.8-beta, –config dev). All three prototypes
were initialized with block #9121452 as genesis block.
A fully functional reference implementation of all concepts
and algorithms of Testimonium, an off-chain client writ-
ten in Go, and the evaluation are available as open-source
projects on GitHub1,2,3. For repeatability, the evaluation
project not only contains the three prototypes used for the
evaluation, but also the evaluation scripts, the necessary
block header data as SQL dump, and the results.
1https://github.com/pantos-io/testimonium
2https://github.com/pantos-io/go-testimonium
3https://github.com/pantos-io/testimonium-
evaluation
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Figure 3: Gas consumption of the Testimonium relay
The Experiments
In the first experiment, we analyze the operational cost (i.e.,
the cost of submitting block headers), the cost of verifying
transaction inclusions, and whether the source blockchain is
correctly replicated within Testimonium. For that, we con-
tinuously submit all block headers of our dataset to each
prototype. The headers are submitted in ascending order
according to their block numbers and timestamp fields. Af-
ter each submission, a transaction inclusion verification on
the genesis block (block #9121452) is triggered. Since the
replicated header chain within Testimonium grows after each
submission, the algorithm checking whether block #9121452
is part of the main chain has to deal with a growing number
of headers. This allows us to observe the cost of transaction
inclusion verification with an increasing search depth.
We determine the cost of each operation by measuring the
gas consumption of its corresponding Ethereum transaction.
Furthermore, after each submission, we log the head of the
main chain and the currently submitted header’s branch id
and branch junction within Testimonium. This allows us to
verify whether the submitted headers of the source block-
chain (i.e., Ethereum main network) are correctly replicated
within the prototypes running on the destination blockchain
(i.e., private development blockchain).
To measure the cost of header disputes, we repeat the
first experiment, however, instead of performing a transac-
tion inclusion verification after each submission, we trigger
a dispute on the genesis block (block #9121452). For sim-
plicity, as we are primarily interested in the cost caused by
the removal of branches, we remove the branch originating
from the disputed header regardless of the actual result of
the header validation. Additionally, after each dispute, all
removed headers are resubmitted to restore the state as it
was before the dispute. This allows us to observe the dis-
pute cost with a growing number of headers that have to be
pruned. The cost of each dispute (in gas) is logged only for
prototypes Testimonium1 and Testimonium2, since proto-
type Baseline already performs the full header validation at
time of submission.
Results
Fig. 3 shows the results from the experiments. Fig. 3(a)
shows the average gas consumption per header submission
for each prototype. With 612,348 gas (standard deviation
of 6,592 gas), Testimonium1 achieves a significant cost re-
duction of 82% over Baseline (average gas consumption of
3,369,653 gas, standard deviation of 5,101 gas). By apply-
ing the content-addressable storage pattern, Testimonium2
reduces the average gas consumption of Testimonium1 by
54%, resulting in gas cost of 284,041 for every submitted
header (standard deviation of 3,679 gas). Compared to
Baseline, Testimonium2 reduces submission cost by 92%.
Fig. 3(b) depicts the cost for transaction inclusion verifi-
cations on the genesis block (block #9121452) for each pro-
totype. The x-axis denotes the number of succeeding block
headers that have already been submitted to the relay. Since
transaction inclusion verifications are always performed on
the genesis block, the search algorithms verifying the mem-
bership on the main chain have to cope with an increasing
search depth. Prototype Baseline using the na¨ıve search al-
gorithm reaches the private blockchain’s block gas limit of
6.7 million gas already after 18,766 submitted headers. Tes-
timonium1 and Testimonium2 can cope with the growing
search depth at much lower cost. Notably, Testimonium2
is slightly more expensive than Testimonium1 due to the
implementation of the content-addressable storage pattern
requiring the full block header to be provided at every trans-
action inclusion verification. Hence, applying this pattern is
a trade-off between low submission cost and slightly higher
verification cost. Notably, gas consumption is measured in
a worst-case scenario where each block header is submitted
to the relay even if it may not be part of the actual main
chain of the source blockchain. In practice, the verification
cost measured for Testimonium1 and Testimonium2 may
be much lower since submitters may be reluctant to submit
headers which are not part of the main chain since these
headers will not yield a profit.
Figure 3(c) shows the dispute cost measured for Testimon-
ium1 and Testimonium2 (note that Baseline has no dispute
cost at all, since it does not implement the validation-on-
demand pattern). Despite the fact that a growing number
of headers is removed with each conducted dispute, the dis-
pute cost of both prototypes temporarily declines. This is
because in Ethereum freeing up contract storage yields a so-
called gas refund which is given at the end of a successful
transaction execution [40]. However, from a certain point
on (after nine headers for Testimonium1 and 23 headers
for Testimonium2 ), the dispute cost starts to rise which is
caused by the design rationale of Ethereum that the gas
refund is capped up to a maximum of the half of the to-
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tal gas consumed by a transaction [40]. Furthermore, as
shown in the figure, Testimonium1 reaches the block gas
limit much earlier than Testimonium2. Notably, the gas re-
fund is given only after the successful execution of a transac-
tion, i.e., reaching the block gas limit makes the transaction
fail without yielding any gas refund. This is why both graphs
stop at around 3,3 million gas (last successful disputes) be-
fore reaching the block gas limit. If a branch is too long to
be disputed within a single invocation, the dispute function
can be called multiple times whereas each invocation prunes
one part of the entire illegal branch.
In the first experiment, the branch id and branch junction
of each submitted header as recorded by each of the three
prototypes was logged. This data allows us to verify whether
all branches of the dataset have been correctly replicated
within the relays. In particular, we extracted all unique
junctions from the results as well as from our dataset. A
comparison of both lists shows that all 2,542 branches were
correctly recognized by the three prototypes. In the next
section, we analyze the security aspects of the proposed relay
scheme.
4.2 Security Analysis
This section provides an informal security analysis of Tes-
timonium. We consider attacks on the relay scheme itself,
e.g., relay poisoning, as well as blockchain-specific attacks.
Further, we consider consequences on the relay scheme in
case changes to the involved blockchains occur.
For the following discussion, we suppose the set of off-
chain clients (i.e., submitters and disputers) to remain static
during an attack. Furthermore, our analysis is based on the
following assumptions: (a) no off-chain client is guaranteed
to follow the protocol rules, (b) the actions of many clients
are driven by self-interest, and (c) some clients may cate-
gorically deviate from the protocol. Accordingly, we catego-
rize off-chain clients into three groups according to the BAR
(Byzantine, Altruistic, Rational) model [4]. This model has
found application in security analysis for blockchain proto-
cols and extensions before (e.g., [17, 18]). Under this model,
byzantine clients may depart arbitrarily from the protocol
for any reason, e.g., they may be faulty or may just follow
strategies optimizing an unknown utility function. Altru-
istic clients always follow the protocol rules, regardless of
whether deviations would lead to a higher profit. They ex-
hibit no adversarial behavior. Finally, rational clients are
self-interested, aiming at maximizing their profit according
to a known utility function. These clients will depart from
the protocol if they expect doing so to yield a higher profit
than being honest.
Relay Poisoning
When verifying the inclusion of transactions, the Testimon-
ium relay relies on block headers submitted by off-chain
clients. Thus, an attacker may try to poison the Testi-
monium relay with wrong information regarding the source
blockchain. For that, the attacker must trigger a chain re-
organization within the relay according to the consensus
rules of the source blockchain, i.e., the attacker must submit
enough block headers such that these headers form the new
main chain within the relay. This would allow the attacker
to perform transaction inclusion verifications on wrong in-
formation. For instance, an application relying on Testi-
monium could be tricked into performing actions on the ba-
sis of transactions that have never happened on the source
blockchain. Essentially, an attacker can choose between two
approaches. Either the attacker sends invalid block headers
to the Testimonium relay or the attacker submits headers
which are themselves valid but belong to blocks containing
invalid transactions (i.e., a header validation in case of a
dispute would not detect any anomaly). We discuss these
two attack models in the next subsections.
Incentive Attacks on Disputes. Option one to achieve re-
lay poisoning is for the attacker to submit illegal block head-
ers while preventing other disputers from disputing these
headers. The advantage of this approach is that the at-
tacker does not have to follow the source blockchain’s con-
sensus rules for creating block headers, e.g., the attacker
does not have to solve the PoW for each header. This en-
ables the attacker to create block headers at a much faster
rate. However, disputes of these illegal headers would be
successful since the block header validation would inevitably
fail. Hence, in order to launch a successful attack, the at-
tacker needs to convince all participating disputers not to
dispute any illegal headers for the duration of the headers’
lock periods, e.g., by launching incentive attacks [18].
Imagine all disputers to act rationally. Since rational
clients seek to maximize profit, they may deviate from the
protocol if doing so yields a higher income. Thus, for the
attack to be successful, the attacker needs to offer disput-
ers an alternative that is more profitable than a successful
dispute of illegal block headers. The more disputers are
participating in the relay, the more expensive the attack be-
comes since each disputer needs to be convinced to follow
the attack. However, if an adversary is able to convince all
disputers, the attack is successful.
A more realistic scenario involves—in addition to ratio-
nal clients—also altruistic clients. Since altruistic clients al-
ways follow the protocol rules, they will not join the attack.
Subsequently, the attack inevitably fails since illegal block
headers will always be disputed by altruistic disputers. As
long as at least one altruistic disputer is participating, relay
poising via incentive attacks on disputes is not possible.
Incentive Attacks on Submissions. Option two for achiev-
ing relay poising is for the attacker to submit block headers
that are valid according to the source blockchain’s header
validation procedure but belong to blocks containing illegal
transactions. Disputing these headers would not be suc-
cessful, since transactions cannot be validated by the relay.
Hence, the attacker could perform transaction inclusion veri-
fications on illegal transactions. If other submitters continue
to submit the correct block headers from the source block-
chain, the only way this attack can be successful is if the
attacker is able to create and submit valid block headers at
a faster rate than the network of the source blockchain, e.g.,
by launching a 51% attack [27].
Alternatively, the attacker could try to convince the other
submitters to refrain from submitting block headers for the
duration of the attack. This way, the attacker’s block head-
ers would be the only ones arriving at the Testimonium relay
on the destination blockchain. If all submitters act ratio-
nally, the attacker may be successful in convincing them to
join the attack, e.g., by offering a bribe. However, since
all submitters need to be convinced, the cost of this attack
grows proportionally with the number of participating sub-
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mitters, analogue to what has been discussed above. Again,
in a scenario involving both altruistic and rational clients, at
least all altruistic submitters will follow the protocol rather
than join the attack. If there is at least one submitter contin-
uously submitting the block headers created by the network
of the source blockchain, the attacker’s branch will not be-
come the main chain within the Testimonium relay. Again,
as long as at least one altruistic submitter is participating,
the attack is not possible.
Blockchain-specific Attacks
While the above sections discuss attacks targeting the Tes-
timonium relay directly, an adversary may also attack Testi-
monium by exploiting security flaws of the underlying block-
chain. For instance, to prevent honest clients from disputing
illegal headers or from submitting new ones in order to poi-
son the relay, an attacker may try to prevent transactions
from being included in the destination blockchain [18, 24,
34, 37], or to tamper with already included transactions [11,
18, 21, 24, 37]. If an attacker is able to prevent disputes of
illegal headers for the duration of the header’s lock period,
a poisoning attack may be successful. The same principle
can be applied when aiming at preventing clients from sub-
mitting new block headers allowing the attacker to form the
new main chain within Testimonium.
While this section highlights some blockchain-specific at-
tacks possibly affecting the security of Testimonium, it does
not make a claim for completeness. Rather, the purpose of
this section is to point out that—even with altruistic clients
participating—an attacker may be successful in attacking
Testimonium by targeting the underlying blockchain. How-
ever, it is not a vulnerability of Testimonium per se when an
attacker exploits security flaws of the blockchain executing
Testimonium since an application can only be as secure as
the system on which it is running.
Changes to the Source Blockchain
As introduced in Section 3, Testimonium keeps track of
block headers of some source blockchain. Hence, besides de-
liberate attacks as discussed in the prior sections, changes
to the source blockchain may affect the reliability of the
Testimonium relay.
When introducing changes to the block header validation
procedure of the source blockchain, the header validation be-
comes either less or more restrictive. In the first case, head-
ers adhering to the new validation rules would be rejected
by the Testimonium relay when being received, or disput-
ers would be able to successfully dispute block headers that
are actually valid under the new rules. If the header valida-
tion becomes more restrictive, newly introduced validation
rules are not enforced by the Testimonium relay, possibly
leading to the acceptance of headers illegal under the new
rules. Thus, any change to the header validation procedure
of the source blockchain requires an update of the header
validation procedure performed by the Testimonium relay.
On the other hand, if changes to the source blockchain do
not affect the header validation procedure, the Testimon-
ium relay does not need to be updated. In case the commu-
nity of the source blockchain does not reach consensus on
an upcoming hard fork, the source blockchain may be split
up, resulting in multiple instances of the same blockchain.
Technically, such instances are hard forks originating at the
same blockchain. While the Testimonium relay is able to
keep track of forks occurring on the source blockchain, only
one fork is used for verifying the inclusion of transactions.
Hence, there may be a competition of multiple instances of
the source blockchain to form the main chain within the Tes-
timonium relay. Which fork eventually overtakes the others
may be unclear at the time the blockchain is split up. If mul-
tiple blockchain instances were to be supported, additional
deployments of Testimonium would be required.
4.3 Testimonium on other Blockchains
The prototypes described in Section 4.1 demonstrate the
feasibility of the proposed blockchain relay for EVM-based
blockchains like Ethereum and Ethereum Classic. In this
section, we analyze the requirements that must be fulfilled
to deploy Testimonium on other blockchains.
Requirements for the Destination Blockchain
When deploying a Testimonium relay on some destination
blockchain, two requirements must be met. First, the desti-
nation blockchain must provide a scripting language expres-
sive enough to implement the concepts outlined in Section 3
as well as the validation of the source blockchain’s consensus
algorithm (e.g., Ethash). In particular, the Testimonium re-
lay on the destination blockchain must be able to execute
the validation procedure without any constraint violations
such as the block gas limit in Ethereum. Otherwise, modi-
fications of the proposed algorithms may be necessary, e.g.,
to spread the validation of the consensus algorithm across
multiple transactions.
Notably, it is sufficient to validate block headers only ac-
cording to the source blockchain’s consensus algorithm in-
stead of performing a full header validation. As long as an
attacker is not able to produce block headers adhering to the
consensus algorithm at a higher rate than the network main-
taining the source blockchain, block headers which are valid
according to the consensus algorithm but still contain some
illegal fields (e.g., wrong block height) will eventually not
form the main chain within Testimonium since the majority
of the network will not build upon these headers. Thus, even
if these headers cannot be disputed, no transaction verifica-
tions are possible on these headers as long as the number of
required confirmation is sufficiently high.
As shown in our reference implementation, Ethereum and
Ethereum Classic are fully suitable for hosting Testimonium
relays. Prominent examples of blockchains currently not
satisfying this requirement are Bitcoin and its forks such as
Bitcoin Cash and Bitcoin SV since their scripting language
only features a limited set of operations [10].
The second requirement for a destination blockchain is the
compliance with certain security guarantees. In Section 4.2,
we highlighted some blockchain-specific attacks that may
break the security of Testimonium. Hence, Testimonium re-
lays should only be implemented for destination blockchains
on which such attacks are unlikely to be successful. An ex-
ample of a blockchain providing very limited security is Ex-
panse, since the low network hash rate of only 130 GH/s at
the time of writing4 (as compared to Ethereum’s 175 TH/s)5
poses significant risk of 51% attacks.
45 December 2019, http://stats.expanse.tech/
55 December 2019, https://etherscan.io/chart/
hashrate
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Requirements for the Source Blockchain
To enable the Testimonium relay on the destination block-
chain to verify (a) the membership of a block b in the main
chain of the source blockchain, (b) a sufficiently high num-
ber of confirmations, and (c) the inclusion of a particular
transaction in b, the source blockchain is required to follow
the data structures proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto [26]. In
particular, to allow the Testimonium relay the verification
of (a) and (b), the source blockchain needs to be a linked list
of block headers where each header contains at least a hash
pointer to the previous block and the block height. Further-
more, to check (c), each block header must store the hash
of the root node of the Merkle tree containing the transac-
tions. While blockchains like Bitcoin or Ethereum satisfy
this requirement [27, 40], ledgers such as IOTA do not since
transactions are stored in a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG),
the so-called Tangle [30]. Last but least, a blockchain should
only be used as source blockchain if the success of attacks
on that blockchain (e.g., 51% attack) is unlikely.
5. RELATED WORK
Testimonium enables blockchain interoperability by pro-
viding the means to exchange (transaction) data across the
boundaries of blockchains. According to Buterin [12] block-
chain interoperability comes in three flavors: hash-locking
schemes, where operations on two blockchains are synced
by the same initial trigger; notary schemes, where a trusted
party ensures that information is transferred between block-
chains; and relay schemes, where a source blockchain’s block
headers are replicated on a destination blockchain enabling
the destination blockchain to verify that certain data exists
on the source blockchain.
Hash-locking is used whenever clients want to synchro-
nize actions across multiple blockchains or between mul-
tiple participants on a single blockchain, e.g., in atomic
swaps [16] or payment channels [29], respectively. To this
end, hash-locking schemes require the synchronized activity
of at least two participants on both blockchains. However,
hash-locking cannot be used to transfer arbitrary informa-
tion from one blockchain to another.
Notary schemes (e.g., [3, 19, 39]) allow transfers of infor-
mation between blockchains by relying on trusted parties
acting as intermediate authorities, i.e., notaries. Notaries
are solely responsible for transferring information from the
source blockchain to the destination blockchain. As long
as the information is signed by the majority of notaries,
the information is regarded as truthful on the destination
blockchain, i.e., besides verifying the notaries’ signatures,
no further on-chain verifications are necessary on the des-
tination blockchain. This makes notary schemes relatively
lightweight, but—due to the high degree of centralization—
also prone to manipulation.
Testimonium itself is a blockchain relay solution with the
most prominent comparative projects being BTC Relay [1],
PeaceRelay [22], and Waterloo [7, 8]. BTC Relay [1] was the
first and so far only relay solution to be operational. Starting
in 2016, it allowed relaying block headers from the Bitcoin
blockchain to the Ethereum blockchain. Due to the specifics
of Bitcoin, fully validating every submitted header on the
Ethereum blockchain is feasible, however this is impractical
for blockchains with expensive header validation protocols
such as Ethereum.
PeaceRelay [22] can be considered the first attempt of a
relay for Ethereum-based blockchains. In its current imple-
mentation, PeaceRelay requires authorized clients to sub-
mit block headers. However, without on-chain validation or
branch handling it is not decentralized and rather a notary
scheme than a relay.
Waterloo [7, 8] attempts to bridge the Ethereum and EOS
blockchains. This project consists of two separate relay
solutions, one from Ethereum to EOS and a second one
from EOS to Ethereum. Similar to BTC Relay, both re-
lays perform full header validations of the respective chains.
The Ethereum validation on EOS implements the optimized
Ethash validation, similar to the full validation reference im-
plementation used in this paper. EOS uses delegated Proof
of Stake as consensus mechanism, which by design allows
cheaper on-chain computations and thus makes Ethash in
this case feasible. For the other direction, delegated Proof
of Stake relies on a changing set of block producers, which
on average happens every 8 hours [7]. Consequently, for re-
laying EOS to Ethereum, it suffices to validate only those
block headers where the block producers change. Water-
loo performs the block header validation for every submit-
ted block header. While this might be practical for a relay
between Ethereum and EOS, this approach becomes prob-
lematic when executing the source blockchain’s header vali-
dation on the destination blockchain is very expensive, e.g.,
for a relay between Ethereum and Ethereum Classic.
To conclude, a number of blockchain relays have been con-
ceptualized so far. However, their applicability largely de-
pends on the underlying blockchains. If fully validating a
submitted block header is an expensive operation, these re-
lays may become impractical due to high operational cost.
If applied to relays between EVM-based blockchains both,
BTC Relay and Waterloo, would face this problem. The
Testimonium relay as proposed in this paper is able to over-
come this challenge by applying a cost-efficient validation-
on-demand pattern together with a sophisticated incentive
structure encouraging participation.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced Testimonium, a secure and
cost-efficient blockchain relay scheme. A Testimonium relay
is especially suitable for blockchains where fully validating
every submitted block header is an expensive task. Our eval-
uation using a proof of concept implementation of Testimon-
ium for EVM-based blockchains showed that Testimonium
is able to reliably verify the inclusion of transactions across
blockchains while reducing the operational cost in compar-
ison to traditional blockchain relays by up to 92% without
jeopardizing decentralization.
In the current approach, every block header of the source
blockchain needs to be submitted to the destination block-
chain even though only a few block headers might actu-
ally be used for transaction inclusion verifications. In future
work, in an effort to reduce submission cost even further, we
will investigate possible batch submission of block headers
as well as look into optimization opportunities for the block
header search algorithm. Finally, Testimonium will act as
basis for the development of an atomic-commit protocol for
distributed transactions between multiple blockchains.
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